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Deferral to Arbitration by the
Pennsylvania Labor Relations Board
James L. Cowden*
I. Introduction
The Pennsylvania Labor Relations 'Board,1 the agency vested
with the authority to adjudicate unfair labor practices under the Pub-
lic Employee Relations Act,2 has recently been asked to refrain from
exercising this authority when a dispute involves questions arbitrable
under collective bargaining agreements.8 Proponents argue that if
the Board were to refrain, then the substance of unfair labor practice
charges, if not the actual statutory issue, could be resolved through
* B.A. 1971, Allegheny College; J.D. 1974, Dickinson School of Law; Asso-
ciate, Handler, Gerber & Weinstock, Harrisburg, Pa. The author gratefully acknowl-
edges the research assistance of James 0. Hausch, a staff member of the Dickinson
Law Review.
1. The Pennsylvania Labor Relations Board (hereinafter referred to as PLRB)
is a three-member board originally created to administer the Pennsylvania Labor
Relations Act, Act of June 1, 1937, P.L. 1168, which regulates the labor relations of
certain private employers over which the National Labor Relations Board, the
administrator of the federal labor laws, has not exercised jurisdiction. The PLRB's
duties were expanded by the enaction of the Pennsylvania Public Employee Relations
Act, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 1101.101-.2301 (Supp. 1976) in 1970 to include
administration of the new law.
2. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 1101.101-.2301 (Supp. 1976) (hereinafter referred
to as "PERA" or the "Act"). This statute governs the labor relations of "public
employers," which the Act defines as
the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, its political subdivisions including
school districts and any other instrumentality thereof and any nonprofit or-
ganization or institution and any charitable, religious, scientific, literary,
recreational, health, educational or welfare institution receiving grants or
appropriations from local, State or Federal governments but shall not in-
clude employers covered or presently subject to coverage under the . . .
"Pennsylvania Labor Relations Act" [PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 211.1 et seq.
(1964)] as amended, (Supp. 1975) [and] . .. the National Labor Rela-
tions Act" [29 U.S.C. § 151 et seq. (1970)].
3. In General Braddock Area School District, 6 Pennsylvania Public Employ-
ee Reporter 99, appeal dismissed, 6 PPER 353 (C.P. Allegheny County 1975) (here-
inafter cited as "PPER"), the board was asked to defer an unfair labor practice
charge to resolution by the grievance-arbitration machinery of the parties' collective
bargaining agreement. The board refused on the ground that the particular case was
inappropriate for deferral because the respondent school district's conduct was de-
signed "to undermine or destroy" the union. The board expressed, however, an inter-




the grievance and arbitration procedures that PERA requires every
collective bargaining agreement to have.4 Several years ago the
National Labor Relations Board adopted such a deferral policy in
Collyer Insulated Wire.5
This article addresses the propriety of PLRB adoption of a
Collyer-like deferral policy. The initial focus is the threshold issue
whether the PLRB has the statutory authority to refuse to consider
unfair labor practice charges. This will entail a consideration of the
federal rationale in adopting the "Collyer" policy and an examination
of PERA to ascertain whether the federal rationale is applicable to
the state labor law structure. Next, the policy considerations favoring
and opposing deferral are examined to determine whether they war-
rant adoption of a deferral policy by the PLRB.
II. PLRB's Statutory Authority to Defer Charges
The enaction of PERA in 1970 drastically changed labor rela-
tions of public employers and their employees in Pennsylvania. It
4. Section 903 of PERA, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 1101.903 (Supp. 1976) pro-
vides in part:
Arbitration of disputes or grievances arising out of the interpretation
of the provisions of a collective bargaining agreement is mandatory. The
procedure to be adopted is a proper subject of bargaining with the proviso
that the final step shall provide for a binding decision by an arbitrator or
a tri-partite board of arbitrators as the parties may agree.
5. The National Labor Relations Board (hereinafter referred to as NLRB)
actually has several deferral policies. For many years it has followed a pol-
icy of deferring to an arbitration award that adjudicates the substance of an unfair
labor practice charge if the award is not "repugnant" to the National Labor Relations
Act and was achieved through a "fair and regular" arbitration proceeding to which
the parties agreed to be bound. Spielberg Mfg. Co., 112 NLRB 1080, 36 LRRM 1152
(1955). Under the original Spielberg policy the NLRB only deferred if an arbitra-
tion award had issued before the NLRB adjudicated the case. At least one NLRB
member views Spielberg not as a deferral policy, but as "a sort of res judicata rule,
designed to prevent relitigation of issues and . . . unrelated to any 'policy' of favoring
arbitration." Collyer Insulated Wire, 192 NLRB 837, 854, 77 LRRM 1931, 1948
(1971) (Jenkins, Member, dissenting). In Dubo Mfg. Corp., 142 NLRB 431, 53
LMMR 1070 (1963), the board took Spielberg a step further and held its adjudication
of an unfair labor practice charge pending the decision of an arbitrator in an
arbitration proceeding that was being simultaneously by the charging party. The
latest advance of the deferral policy is the doctrine of Collyer Insulated Wire, 192
NLRB 837, 77 LRRM 1931 (1971). Under this policy the NLRB will refuse to
process an unfair labor practice charge if the dispute underlying the charge could be
taken to arbitration. It thus forces a charging party to go to arbitration even though
the charging party has already chosen to seek relief through the board instead of
through arbitration.
It appears that the PLRB already is following Spielberg and Dubo-type policies.
See General Braddock Area School Dist., 6 PPER 99, appeal dismissed, 6 PPER 653
(C.P. Allegheny County 1975); Rose Tree Media School Dist., 4 PPER 153 (1974).
expressly repealed the previous law, which prohibited strikes by
public employees, and gave most public employees a limited right to
strike.6 With severe criticism of labor strife, the General Assembly
made "unresolved disputes between the public employer and its em-
ployees" the target of a statutory scheme designed to prevent disrup-
tion in the supply of public services. 7  To accomplish its goal of
promoting "orderly and constructive relationships" between employ-
ers and employees, 8 PERA provided for mandatory grievance arbitra-
tion,9 prohibited eighteen types of conduct by public employers and
unions called "unfair labor practices,"'10 and set up mediation and
fact-finding procedures.1"
In many ways PERA reflects the influence of federal labor
laws. The Labor-Management Relations Act of 1947,12 which in-
cludes the original National Labor Relations Act of 1935,' provides
for a labor board to process unfair labor practices. 14 The wording of
some of PERA's unfair labor practices is similar to that of LMRA. 5
Although LMRA does not require employers and employees to write
grievance and arbitration machinery into their contracts, as does
PERA, 16 it strongly states federal policy as favoring final adjust-
ment of disputes over collective bargaining agreements "by a method
agreed upon by the parties," e.g., arbitration.' 7
6. Before PERA the labor relations of public employers were subject to the
Act of June 30, 1947, P.L. 1183, which was expressly repealed by PERA. PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 43, § 1101.2201 (Supp. 1976). The earlier law prohibited strikes by public
employees and provided severe penalties for violators. In contrast, PERA creates a
comprehensive regulatory system designed to guarantee the rights of employees to
organize, grants a limited right to strike, and provides mechanisms to prevent disrup-
tions in the supply of public services. See generally, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43,
0H 1101.101-2301 (Supp. 1976).
7. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 1101.101 (Supp. 1975).
8. Id.
9. Id. § 1101.903.
10. Id. § 1101.1201.
11. Id. § 1101.801-.803.
12. 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-197 (1970) (hereinafter referred to as "LMRA").
13. Act of 1935, 49 Stat. 449. Sections 151 through 168 of LMRA, which
is the original National Labor Relations Act and its amendments, is now known
as National Labor Relations Act. 29 U.S.C. § 167 (1970). Future references
to the National Labor Relations Act (sometimes called the "NLRA") are to the
amended and codified act.
14. 29 U.S.C. H§ 153, 160 (1970). The NLRB is a five-member board with
jurisdiction to prevent unfair labor practices. Pennington v. Mine Workers Union,
325 F.2d 804 (6th Cir. 1963), rev'd on other grounds, 381 U.S. 657 (1965).
15. Compare § 120,1 of PERA, Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 43, § 1101.1201 (Supp. 1976)
to § 8 of NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 158 (1970). For example, § 8(a)(5) makes it illegal
for an employer "to refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives of his
employees," as does § 1201(a) (5) of PERA.
16. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 1101.903 (Supp. 1976). See note 4 supra.
17. 29 U.S.C. § 173(d). This provision has been heavily relied upon by the
courts and the NLRB as creating a federal policy favoring arbitration. See generally
Gateway Coal Co. v. Mine Workers Union, 414 U.S. 368 (1974); Steelworkers Union
v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960); Steelworkers Union v.
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Given the General Assembly's obvious reliance on the federal
model as a pattern for the framework of PERA and the resultant
similarity between the statutes, it is natural that decisions and policies
under LMRA have often been consulted by the adjudicators of
PERA18. The opinions of the NLRB and federal courts are
discussed and frequently followed by Pennsylvania courts and the
state board.19 Therefore, the NLRB's adoption of a policy of defer-
ring unfair labor practice charges to arbitration is bound to receive
serious consideration by the state board. 0 Hence, the rationale for
this policy should be examined.
A. The NLRB and the "Collyer Policy"
With limited exceptions for situations involving special issues or
facts,2 the policy of the NLRB now permits deferral of an unfair
Warrior and Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); Steelworkers Union v.
American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960). See also Collyer Insulated Wire, 192
NLRB 837, 77 LRRM 1931 (1971).
18. Compare generally 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-168 (1970) and PA. STAT. ANN. tit.
43, §§ 1101.101-.1607 (Supp. 1976).
19. In Wilkinsburg v. Sanitation Department, - Pa. -, - n.5, 345 A.2d 641,
643 n.5 (1975), the state supreme court stated "We have held that practice under the
NLRA may be looked to for guidance in interpreting similar provisions of Pennsyl-
vania labor legislation. PLRB v. Loose, 402 Pa. 620, 623, 168 A.2d 323, 325 (1961).
Care is required in applying NLRA practice .... ." The court has confined its
reluctance to adopt NLRA interpretations mainly to the scope of collective bargaining
duties of public employers. PLRB v. State College Area School Dist., 461 Pa. 494,
499, 337 A.2d 262, 264 (1975). Some PLRB cases considering application of NLRA
policies are Duquesne School District, 3 PPER 35 (1973), Montefiore Hospital, 5
PPER 98 (1974), and Emsworth Borough, 4 PPER 114 (1974).
20. The board's discussion of the NLRB's deferral policy in General Braddock
Area School District, 6 PPER 99, appeal dismissed, 6 PPER 353 (C.P. Allegheny
County 1975), indicates that this consideration has already begun.
21. The NLRB has said it will not defer in the following situations: if an em-
ployer is accused of discriminating against an employee for filing a charge with or
giving testimony before the Board, McKinley Transp., Ltd., 219 NLRB No. 184, 90
LRRM 1195 (1975); if a question of accretion of employees to an existing bargain-
ing unit is involved, Hershey Foods Corp., 208 NLRB 452, 85 LRRM 1312 (1975);
Germantown Development Corp., 207 NLRB 586, 84 LRRM 1495 (1973); Combus-
tion Eng'r, 195 NLRB 909, 79 LRRM 1577 (1972); Collyer Insulated Wire, 192
NLRB 837, 845, 77 LRRM 1931, 1938 (1971) (Brown, Member, concurring); if
there is a question whether a valid agreement existed at the time the dispute arose,
Nat'l Heat & Power Corp., 201 NLRB 1019, 82 LRRM 1436 (1973); Borden, Inc.,
196 NLRB 1170, 80 LRRM 1240 (1972); if the issue is the employer's refusal to
disclose information needed to process grievances or to bargain and there is no con-
tract clause expressly governing such disclosure, United Aircraft Corp., 204 NLRB
879, 83 LRRM 1411 (1973), aff'd, 525 F.2d 237 (2d Cir. 1975); American Stand-
ard, Inc., 203 NLRB 1132, 83 LRRM 1245 (1973); if the integrity or viability of
the grievance-arbitration procedure has been threatened, El Dorado Club, 220 NLRB
No. 152, 90 LRRM 1373 (1975); Elec. Workers, Local 742 (Randall Bearings, Inc.),
669
labor practice charge if it appears that arbitration of the associated
contractual issue will resolve the underlying dispute.22 The NLRB
has deferred allegations of violations of sections 8(a)(1), 23 (2),24
(3)2 1 and (5),26 8(b)(1)(A)l and (B), 28 8(b) (2)29 and (3).8 0
213 NLRB 824, 87 LRRM 1272 (1974); Longshoremen, Local 6 (Assoc. Food
Stores, Inc.), 210 NLRB 666, 86 LRRM 1534 (1974); Diversified Indus., 208 NLRB
233, 85 LRRM 1394 (1974); if the respondent's conduct amounts to a rejection of
fundamental principles of collective bargaining, Communications Workers (Western
Elec. Co.), 204 NLRB 782, 83 LRRM 1583 (1973); Mountain State Constr. Co.,
203 NLRB 1085, 83 LRRM 1208 (1973); if the arbitrator would be bound to enforce
an illegal contract provision, Retail Clerks, Local 770 (Hughes Mkts., Inc.), 218
NLRB No. 84, 89 LRRM 1407 (1975); Operating Eng'rs, Local 701 (Assoc. Gen.
Contr's), 216 NLRB No. 45, 88 LRRM 1243 (1975); if the employer has demon-
strated anti-union animus in the situation sub judice, cf., United Aircraft Corp.,
supra.
22. This standard was referred to in National Radio Co., 198 NLRB 527, 531,
80 LRRM 1718, 1723 (1972), but was not clearly adopted as the governing rule until
United Aircraft Corp., 204 NLRB 879, 83 LRRM 1411, 1412 (1973), affd, 525
F.2d 237 (2d Cir. 1975).
23. Section 8(a)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (1970), bars an employer from
interfering with, restraining, or coercing employees in the exercise of their rights
under § 7 of the NLRA, id. § 157. Section 7 guarantees the right to engage in or to
refuse to engage in union activities, except as the right to refuse may be qualified by a
contract clause creating a closed shop. Because all other unfair labor practices under
§ 8(a) are automatically violations of § 8(a) (1), all cases in which the board has
deferred have included deferrals of § 8(a) (1) charges. E.g., Collyer Insulated Wire,
192 NLRB 837, 77 LRRM 1931 (1971).
24. Section 8(a) (2) prohibits employer domination or interference with the
formation or administration of a union. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (2) (1970). The NLRB
deferred such a charge in Associated Press, 199 NLRB 1110, 81 LRRM 1535 (1972).
25. National Radio Co., 198 NLRB 527, 80 LRRM 1718 (1972). Section
8 (a) (3 ) bars employer discrimination in hire or tenure of employment or any term or
condition of employment to encourage or discourage union membership. 29 U.S.C. §
158(a) (3) (1970).
26. Section 8(a)(5), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1970) makes unlawful an
employer's refusal to bargain collectively with the representative of his employees.
Collyer Insulated Wire, 192 NLRB 837, 77 LRRM 1931 (1971) was such a case.
27. Section 8(b)(1)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (1) (A) (1970) prohibits interfer-
ence with an employee's § 7 rights, see note 23 supra, by a union. In it are subsumed
violations of other sections of § 8(b). Teamsters, Local 70 (Nat'l Biscuit Co.), 198
NLRB 552, 80 LRRM 1727 (1972), af 'd, 479 F.2d 770 (2d Cir. 1973).
28. Typographers Local 101 (Washington Post Co.), 207 NLRB 831, 85
LRRM 1018 (1973); Mailers, Local 36, (Houston Chronicle Pub. Co.) 199 NLRB
804, 81 LRRM 1310 (1972). A violation of § 8(b)(1)(B) is a union's restraint or
coercion of an employer in the selection of collective bargaining or grievance
representatives.
29. Newspaper Guild of Brockton (Enterprise Pub. Co.), 201 NLRB 793, 82
LRRM 1337 (1973), affd, 493 F.2d 1024 (lst Cir. 1974). Teamsters, Local 70
(Nat'l Biscuit Co.) 198 NLRB 552, 80 LRRM 1727 (1972), afl'd, 479, F.2d 770 (2d
Cir. 1973). Section 8(b)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (2) (1970) prohibits a union to:
cause or attempt to cause an employer to discriminate against an em-
ployee in violation of subsection (a) (3) of this section or to discriminate
against an employee with respect to whom membership in such organization
has been denied or terminated on some ground other than his failure to ten-
der the periodic dues and the initiation fees normally required as a condi-
tion of acquiring or retaining membership.
30. Teamsters, Local 70 (Nat'l Biscuit Co.), 198 NLRB 552, 80 LRRM 1727
(1972), aHfd, 479 F.2d 770 (2d Cir. 1973). Section 8(b)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)




The legal basis of the NLRB's adoption of this policy was its
finding in Collyer that the federal labor laws"' intend arbitration to
be, as far as practicable, the means of resolving labor disputes.32
There the issue presented was whether respondent had violated the
collective bargaining agreement by unilaterally changing wage rates
and reassigning work.s8 The statutory issue was coincident with the
issue under the arbitration provision of the collective agreement: did
the agreement empower respondent unilaterally to change wage
rates. The issue was adjudicable by the Board and by an arbitrator.34
The NLRB decided that in such a situation federal policy favors use
of only one forum and the preferred forum for resolution of labor
contract issues is arbitration.85
31. The "federal labor laws" are the statutes now known as the Labor-
Management Relations Act, 1947, 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-197 (1970). They include the
original National Labor Relations Act, Act of 1935, 49 Stat. 449, The Taft-Hartley
Act, Act of 1947, 61 Stat. 136, and the Landrum-Griffin Act, also known as the La-
bor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act, Act of 1959, 73 Stat. 519.
32. Collyer Insulated Wire, 192 NLRB 837, 839-42, 77 LRRM 1931, 1934-35
(1971).
33. There were three charges of refusal to bargain in Collyer. Two concerned
the employer's unilateral increase in incentive pay for two classifications of employ-
ees. The other charge protected the employer's re-assignment of a cleaning operation
from two-man teams of maintenance machinists to one maintenance machinist with
the assistance of the machine operator and helper. Id. at 837-39, 77 LRRM at 1932-
1933. These changes were instituted only two months after the employer and union
had agreed to a new collective bargaining agreement.
34. The contract contained clauses governing the assignment of work and the
employer's right to raise incentive pay. The arbitration clause defined a grievance as
a controversy between an employee and his supervisor or between the union and the
employer concerning "the interpretation, application, or violation of any provision" of
the contract. A grievance could be submitted to an arbitrator for final and binding
adjudication. Id. at 839, 77 LRRM at 1933-34.
35. The NLRB quoted its pervious decision in Jos. Schlitz Brewing Co., 175
NLRB 141, 70 LRRM 1972 (1969), in which it had deferred a case to arbitration
on an ad hoc basis:
Thus we believe that where, as here, the contract clearly provides for
grievance and arbitration machinery, where the unilateral action taken is
not designed to undermine the Union and is not patently erroneous but
rather is based on a substantial claim of contractual privilege, and it appears
that the arbitral interpretation of the contract will resolve both the unfair
labor practice issue in a manner compatible with the purposes of the Act,
then the Board should defer to the arbitration clause conceived by the par-
ties. This particular case is indeed an appropriate one for just such defer-
ral. The parties have an unusually long established and successful bargain-
ing relationship; they have a dispute involving substantive contract interpre-
tation almost classical in its form, each party asserting a reasonable claim
in good faith in a situation wholly devoid of unlawful conduct or aggravated
circumstances of any kind; they have a clearly defined grievance-arbitration
procedure which Respondent has urged the Union to use for resolving their
dispute; and, significantly, the Respondent, the party which in fact desires
to abide by the terms of its contract, is the same party which, although it
firmly believed in good faith in its right under the contract to take the ac-
tion it did take, offered to discuss the entire matter with the Union prior
The NLRB quickly expanded its deferral policy beyond the
narrow holding of Collyer to include deferral in situations in which
the statutory and contractual issues were not congruent. In Na-
tional Radio Co.36 the employer was charged, inter alia, with
violating sections 8(a)(3) and (5) by unilaterally implementing a
rule that required union stewards to report to their supervisors before
leaving their work areas to perform union business and by discharg-
ing a steward for violating that rule.17 The right of the employer to
implement the rule posed, as in Collyer, identical contractual and
statutory issues,"' but the charge of unlawful discharge did not. 9 The
NLRB recognized that the statutory and contractual issues were
similar, but not congruent:
[T]here exists a narrow penumbra of the dispute wherein it is
possible that adoption of the reporting procedure was within re-
spondent's contractually sanctioned domain and, so, no breach
of agreement, but nevertheless prohibited by the Act because
undertaken for discriminatory motive.40
The Board deferred the charge to arbitration, noting that arbi-
tration clauses appear in almost all collective bargaining agreements
and that discipline cases make up the greatest number of cases taken
to arbitration. 41 The NLRB also found that arbitration has a "thera-
peutic" effect on a collective bargaining relationship, but that Board
action is sometimes "unsettling."42 In such circumstances, the Board
said, national policy can best be furthered by permitting an arbitrator
the first opportunity to resolve the dispute.43
The NLRB's finding that federal law grants pre-eminence to
arbitration rests on a three-part construct: (1) many labor disputes
are resolvable in arbitration as well as in NLRB proceedings;44 (2)
the NLRB's exercise of jurisdiction over cases that could be resolved
to taking such action. Accordingly, under the principles above stated, and
the persuasive facts in this case, we believe that the policy of promoting
industrial peace and stability through collective bargaining obliges us to
defer the parties to the grievance-arbitration procedures they themselves
have voluntarily established.
Collyer Insulated Wire, 192 NLRB 837, 841-42, 77 LRRM 1931i, 1936 (1971).
36. 198 NLRB 527, 80 LRRM 1718 (1972). The union in National Radio al-
so filed grievances protesting the employer's actions, and therefore the case might
have been disposed of under the Spielberg or Dubo precedents. See note 5 supra.
However, the arbitrator withheld his decision on the grievance pending the NLRB's
adjudication of the unfair labor practice charges, 198 NLRB 527, 529, 80 LRRM
1718, 1721 (1972).
37. 198 NLRB 527, 527-30, 80 LRRM 1718, 1719-22 (1972).
38. Id. at 530, 80 LRRM at 1721.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 531, 80 LRRM at 1723.
42. Id. at 532, 80 LRRM at 1723.
43. Id. at 530, 80 LRRM at 1722.




in either forum discourages use of arbitration;4 5 and (3) nationar
policy prefers resolution of such disputes in arbitration rather than by
the Board.4 6 If the same construct can be built under PERA, in the
absence of contrary statutory language, there exists a sound founda-
tion for the PLRB to promulgate a Collyer-like deferral policy.
B. Applicability of the NLRB's Rationale to PERA
The first two parts of the NLRB's rationale can be accepted as
valid under PERA with little hesitation. The first leg of the three-
part construct is obviously as true under PERA as under NLRA:
47
many disputes cognizable as unfair labor practices under PERA are
resolvable in arbitration. Like the national act, PERA makes it
unlawful for an employer and a union to refuse to bargain collective-
ly48 and for an employer to discriminate against employees because of
union activities.49 These were the same unfair labor practices at issue
in the Collyer and National Radio cases.50 The second leg is likewise
satisfied. Although the NLRB cited no study to show that persons
who file charges with it do not also file grievances on the same subject
and take those same grievances to arbitration, it is a reasonable as-
sumption that some of those who file charges would not pursue
arbitration if the Board were willing to adjudicate their disputes. 5 If
45. Id. at 840-41, 77 LRRM at 1935.
46. Id. at 841-42, 77 LRRM at 1935-36.
47. The fact that the PERA requires every collective bargaining agreement to
have an arbitration clause covering "disputes and grievances arising out of the
interpretation of' [its] provisions," PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 1101.903 (Supp. 1976),
means that any unilateral action by an employer that pertains to a subject covered by
the labor contract assures a potential overlap with the unfair labor practice of refusal
to bargain, id. § 1101.1201 (a)(5).
48. Id. § 1201(a)(5) and (b)(3).
49. Id. § 1201(a)(3).
50. Collyer involved a charge of refusal to bargain under 29 U.S.C. §
158 (a) (5) (1970), and National Radio involved charges of refusal to bargain and of
discrimination to discourage union activity under 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) and (5)
(1970). Parts of these sections are reproduced nearly verbatim in their PERA
counterparts, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 1201 (a) (3) and (5) (Supp. 1976).
51. The NLRB reiterated a statement it had made in Consolidated Aircraft
Corp., 47 NLRB 694, 706, 12 LRRM 44 (1943) enf'd in pertinent part, 141 F.2d
785 (9th Cir. 1944):
[Ilt will not effectuate the statutory policy of encouraging the practice
and procedure of collective bargaining for the Board to assume the role of
policing collective contracts between employers and labor organizations by
attempting to decide whether disputes as to the meaning and administration
of such contracts constitute unfair labor practices under, the Act. On the
contrary, we believe that parties to collective contracts would thereby be en-
couraged to abandon their efforts to dispose of disputes under the contracts
through collective bargaining or through the settlement procedures mutually
this is true about persons filing charges with the NLRB, it also ought
to be true of those filing with the PLRB.
Meeting the third leg of the NLRB's construct is not as simple.
The national Board based its ruling on a statutory provision that has
no analogue in PERA, the Taft-Hartley Act's declaration that
"[f]inal adjustment by a method agreed upon by the parties [viz.,
arbitration] is . . . the desirable method for settlement of grievance
disputes arising over the application or interpretation of an existing
collective bargaining agreement.""2
Some PERA provisions demonstrate a legislative intent to make
arbitration a very important instrument to achieve PERA's primary
goal of preventing disruption in the supply of public services because
of labor disputes.53 PERA lists three means to achieve this goal, one
of which is the establishment of "procedures to provide for the
protection of the rights of the public employee, the public employer,
and the public at large."54  By making an arbitration clause a re-
quired part of every collective bargaining agreement, PERA plainly
makes arbitration one of these procedures.5 5  This indicates legisla-
tive belief that arbitration is a very valuable tool in the resolution of
labor disputes.56 The Pennsylvania supreme court has held that the
Act's requirement of arbitration in collective bargaining agreements
agreed upon by them, and to remit the interpretation and administration of
their contracts to the Board. We therefore do not deem it wise to exercise
our jurisdiction in such a case, where the parties have not exhausted their
rights and remedies under the contract as to which this dispute has arisen.
Collyer Insulated Wire, 192 NLRB 837, 841, 77 LRRM 1931, 1936 (1971).
52. 29 U.S.C. § 203(d) (1970). The NLRB cited also a draft of other
authority stating preferences for arbitration, most of which rested in turn on section
203(d). Carey v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 375 U.S. 261 (1964); Steelworkers
Union v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960); Steelworkers Union v.
Warrior & Gulf Nay. Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); Steelworkers Union v. American
Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960).
53. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 1101.101 (Supp. 1976).
54. The General Assembly has determined that the overall policy
may best be accomplished by (1) granting to public employees the right
to organize and choose freely their representatives; (2) requiring public em-
ployers to negotiate and bargain with employee organizations representing
public employees and to enter into written agreements evidencing the result
of such bargaining; and (3) establishing procedures to provide for the pro-
tection of the rights of the public employee, the public employer and the
public at large.
Id.
55. Id. § 1101.903.
56. The United States Supreme Court has long recognized arbitration as "the
substitute for industrial strife." Steelworkers Union v. Warrior & Gulf Nay. Co., 363
U.S. 574, 578 (1960). The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has found the same belief
to be held by the General Assembly:
Historically, the primary means of resolving such disputes was the strike.
• . . However, resolution of all disputes by resort to economic force is
costly to the parties, and more importantly, to the public. The General As-
sembly therefore chose to make the widely used procedure of labor arbitra-
tion mandatory under the PERA.
Board of Education v. Philadelphia Fed. of Teachers, Local No. 3, - Pa. -, -,
346 A.2d 35, 39 (1975).
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manifests a state policy favoring arbitration that "is even stronger
than that embodied in the federal labor policy."5
Despite the requirement of arbitration and these strong words
from the court, however, there is nothing in PERA that gives arbitra-
tion the pre-eminence that section 203(d) of LMRA vests it with
under federal law. At the same time the General Assembly required
arbitration clauses to be written into every collective bargaining
agreement, it gave the PLRB concurrent jurisdiction over many
disputes that are resolvable in arbitration, such as refusals to bargain
and employer discrimination on account of union activity.5 8  The
route of PLRB relief, like the route of arbitration relief, is one of the
procedures designed to protect the rights guaranteed by the Act and
thereby to achieve the ultimate goal of preventing unresolved disputes
from disrupting the supply of public services. Neither is predomi-
nant.
Even the strong policy favoring arbitration found by the state
supreme court does not establish a legislative preference for arbitra-
tion over PLRB procedures. In Board of Education v. Philadelphia
Federation of Teachers, Local No. 3,59 in which the supreme
court first articulated its belief that PERA strongly favors arbi-
tration,60 the question was whether a school district must agree in
a collective agreement to arbitrate the discharge of teachers. 61 The
Public School Code grants jurisdiction to discipline and discharge
teachers to the school boards.62 The school board argued that sec-
tion 703 of PERA,"3 which bars implementation of terms in labor
contracts that "would be in violation of, or inconsistent with, or in
conflict with" any other statute, made its agreement to arbitrate
teacher discipline invalid.64 The court interpreted section 703 to bar
57. "Federal policy merely favors the submission of disputes to arbitration,
while the PERA requires it," the court said. - Pa. at -, 346 A.2d at 39.
58. The PLRB not only grants exclusive jurisdiction to prevent unfair labor
practices to the PLRB, but protects that power by providing that it "shall not be
affected by any other means of adjustment or prevention that have been or may be
established by agreement, law, or otherwise." PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 1101.1301
(Supp. 1976).
59. - Pa. -,346 A.2d 35 (1975).
60. Id. at -, 346 A.2d at 39.
61. Id. at -, 346 A.2d at 36. The collective bargaining agreement provided
that "[a] teacher or other employee who does not have tenure shall not be subjected
to discipline or discharge except for just cause." Id.
62. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, §§ 5-510, 5-514 (1962).
63. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 1101.703 (Supp. 1976).
64. - Pa. -, -, 346 A.2d 35, 37 (1975).
only enforcement of contract provisions that "delegate to the arbitra-
tor a responsibility which the General Assembly has commanded shall
be 'discharged by the [school] board and the board alone.' "' The
court then looked to other PERA provisions for guidance, noting that
the very enactment of PERA repudiated "the traditional concept of
the sanctity of management prerogatives in the public sector."6  It
saw arbitration not only as a method of dispute resolution, but as part
of the continuing process of collective bargaining. The fact that
PERA does not disfavor arbitration, but rather commands it, was
seen by the court as evidence of a statutory directive to give broad
purview to the duty to arbitrate disputes over contract terms, just as it
had given broad purview to the duty to bargain collectively over
wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment. 7 As
enunciated in this case, therefore, PERA policy favoring arbitration is
part of the broad construction given to the duty to bargain collective-
ly. The case does not hold that arbitration is preferred over court or
board resolution, but that arbitration is preferred over unilateral
decision-making by management. 6  Nevertheless, dicta in the case
indicate that the Pennsylvania supreme court believes that promotion
of dispute resolution by arbitrators is a wise policy.69
Understanding the PLRB's relationship to arbitration is critical
to answering the question whether state policy favors the adoption
of a Collyer-like policy. The only provisions of PERA that directly
relate the use of arbitration to board procedures are two unfair labor
practices. First, the Act makes it unlawful for an employer to refuse
to bargain and expressly provides that an employer's refusal to discuss
a grievance is a refusal to bargain.7" The PLRB has held that this
unfair labor practice also makes an employer's refusal to submit a
grievance to arbitration a violation of PERA.71  Second, the Act
makes it illegal for an employer or a union to refuse to comply with
"an arbitration award deemed binding" under it.72  The common-
65. Id. at -, 346 A.2d at 38. The court quoted from its decision in PLRB v.
State College Area School District, 461 Pa. 494, 510, 337 A.2d 262, 269 (1975).
66. - Pa. -, -, 346 A.3d 35, 39 (1975).
67. By relying on PLRB v. State College Area School District, 461 Pa. 494,
337 A.2d 262 (1975), in which it defined the scope of the duty to bargain collec-
tively, the court indicated the relationship between arbitration and collective bargain-
ing. In a later case the court expressly stated that arbitration is "part and parcel of
the collective bargaining process." Lincoln University v. Lincoln University Chapter,
University Professors, - Pa. -, -, 354 A.2d 576, 580 (1976). See also Steelwork-
ers Union v. Warrior & Gulf Nav. Co., 363 U.S. 574, 578 (1960).
68. An employer has the authority to make unilateral decisions on whatever he
is not required to bargain over. By requiring an employer to arbitrate certain subject
matter, the court implies that the subject is appropriate for bargaining.
69. - Pa. -, -, 346 A.2d 35, 39 (1975).
70. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 1101.1201(a) (5) (Supp. 1976).
71. Shippensburg Area School Dist., 6 PPER 349 (1975); Portage Area School
Dist., 6 PPER 3.31 (1975).
72. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 1101.1201(a) (8), (b)(8) (Supp. 1976).
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wealth court has held that the PLRB has a statutory duty to
determine whether an award is "binding" before it can hold a respon-
dent guilty of a violation of this section.73 Thus, under the statutory
scheme the PLRB has the responsibility to promote arbitration at the
beginning and end of the process-by ordering an employer to
discuss or to arbitrate a grievance and by ordering a party to an
arbitration to comply with a binding arbitration award.
These provisions establish a role for the state board in advancing
the use of arbitration. Nothing, however, prevents the board from
considering the subject matter of a grievance brought before it as an
unfair labor practice should the charging party wish it to do so.
74
Similarly, nothing prevents the board from re-adjudicating the subject
matter of an arbitration award before it for enforcement if one of the
parties wishes the board to do so and the dispute constitutes an unfair
labor practice. 75  Under the provision giving the PLRB exclusive
jurisdiction to remedy unfair labor practices, its ruling on the arbitra-
ble matter would prevail over a contrary arbitrator's award.
76
The foregoing analysis of PERA does not reveal the clear prefer-
ence for arbitration that is found in the LMRA. Rather, PERA
creates a system of collective bargaining and a system for resolution
of unfair labor practices, and designates no preference for either. In
the same section of the Act that permits the PLRB to aid arbitration,
the PLRB is given authority to hear a matter that could be arbitrated
and to redetermine a matter that has been arbitrated. One cannot say
that PERA makes arbitration the preferred method of dispute resolu-
tion. The final leg of the three-part construct on which the NLRB's
adoption of its deferral policy is based cannot be built under PERA.
73. PLRB v. Commonwealth, - Pa. Commonwealth Ct. -, 350 A.2d 199
(1976).
74. Cf. NLRB v. Brotherhood of Ry., Airline & Steamship Clerks, 498 F.2d
1105 (5th Cir. 1974); NLRB v. Strong, 393 U.S. 357 (1969); NLRB v. M & M
Oldsmobile, Inc., 377 F.2d 712 (1967). See also Office Employees, Local 425 v.
NLRB, 419 F.2d 314 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
75. Cf. Carey v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 375 U.S. 261 (1974); Local 7-210,
Oil Workers v. Union Tank Car Co., 475 F.2d 194 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied,
414 U.S. 875 (1973). Of course, the proceeding to enforce the award and proceeding
to adjudicate the charge seeking relitigation of the dispute underlying the award
would probably be separate unfair labor practice proceedings.
76. Id. The cases under NLRA stating that an NLRB ruling will supersede an
arbitration award on the same subject are based on 29 U.S.C. § 160(a) (1970), which
states that the national board's power "shall not be affected by any other means of
adjustment or prevention that has been or may be established by agreement, law, or
otherwise." Identical language appears in PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, §§ 1101.1301 (Supp.
1975), making NLRA precedent especially persuasive as authority under PERA.
C. The PLRB's Duty to Exercise Jurisdiction
Two provisions of PERA govern the duty of the state board to
adjudicate unfair labor practice charges. Section 501, entitled "Pow-
ers and duties of Board," states:
The board shall exercise those powers and perform those
duties which are specifically provided for in this act. These
powers and duties shall be in addition to and exercised com-
pletely independent of any powers and duties specifically
granted to it by other statutory enactments.
77
Another provision, section 1301, is the analogue71 of a nearly identi-
cal NLRB section:
The board is empowered, as hereinafter provided, to pre-
vent any person from engaging in any unfair labor practice listed
in Article XII of this act. This power shall be exclusive and
shall not be affected by any other means of adjustment or pre-
vention that have been or may be established by agreement, law,
or otherwise.
79
Members of the NLRB who dissent from the Collyer policy ar-
gue that the NLRB analogue to section 1301 requires the national
board to adjudicate unfair labor practices."' The dissenters contend
that although contractual issues may sometimes be related to unfair
labor practice charges, the issue presented by the charge is always
statutory,8' and court-made precedent under the NLRA permits res-
olution of these statutory issues only by the Board. Refusal to process
charges amounts to an abdication of statutory responsibility, they
say. 2 The NLRB majority rejects this argument on the ground that
the Act does not order the Board to adjudicate unfair practice
charges, but only empowers it to do so,8" and gives the Board power
"to respect an arbitration award and decline to exercise its authority
over alleged unfair labor practices if to do so will serve the funda-
mental aims of the act.
''84
77. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 1101.501 (Supp. 1976) (emphasis added).
78. 29 U.S.C. § 160(a) (1970). See note 76 supra.
79. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 1101.1301 (Supp. 1976).
80. I believe the majority's policy is contrary to the intent of Con-
gress and, indeed, beyond the power of the Board. Section 10(a) of the
Act [29 U.S.C. § 160(a)] clearly states that the Board's power to prevent
unfair labor practices shall not be affected by other means of adjustment
or prevention that has been or may be established by agreement, law, or
otherwise.
Collyer Insulated Wire, 192 NLRB 837, 849, 77 LRRM 1931, 1943 (1971) (Fan-
ning, Member, dissenting).
81. Id. See generally, National Radio Co., 198 NLRB 527, 532-35, 80 LRRM
1718, 1724-27 (1972) (Fanning and Jenkins, Members, dissenting).
82. Collyer Insulated Wire, 192 NLRB 837, 847, 77 LRRM 1931, 1944 (1971)
(Fanning, Member, dissenting); National Radio Co., 198 NLRB 527, 533, 80 LRRM
1718, 1725 (1972) (Fanning and Jenkins, Members, dissenting).
83. "[N]othing in the Act intimates that the Board must exercise jurisdiction
.... "Collyer Insulated Wire, 192 NLRB 837, 840, 77 LRRM 1931, 1934 (1971).
84. Id., 77 LRRM at 1935. The quotation is taken from International Harv.
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If there is any ambiguity in NLRA as to the national Board's
duty to exercise its power to adjudicate unfair labor practice charges,
that ambiguity does not exist in PERA. For not only does PERA
vest the state Board with exclusive jurisdiction to remedy unfair
practices, but section 501 orders the Board to do so: "The board shall
exercise those powers and perform those duties entrusted to it."8 5
The word "shall" is not always used in statutes to make a
provision mandatory. The Pennsylvania courts have found "shall" to
have an imperative meaning in some places8" and a permissive mean-
ing in others:8 7 "The word shall is. . . generally regarded as impera-
tive [citations omitted.] We look to the intention and purpose of the
statute in determining whether the word shall is to be given a permis-
sive or imperative meaning."88 In the case from which this quotation
is taken the state supreme court held that a statute89 stating that a
municipal authority "shall" offer to submit a dispute over the terms of
a new collective bargaining agreement to arbitration meant that the
authority was required to do so.9" To reach its decision the court
tried to discern the legislative intent in using "shall" by examining
other uses of the word in the statute and by examining the purpose of
the statute."
The word "shall" is used often in PERA and appears to have an
imperative meaning. There is an exception to this general rule when
the word is used in formal statute-drafter's parlance-for example,
"the board shall have authority" to make rules and regulations.9 2
In this context the word "shall" does not require the board to pro-
mulgate regulations, but merely gives it authority to do soY8 The use
Co., 138 NLRB 923, 925-26, 51 LRRM 1155, 1156 (1962), enf'd, 327 F.2d 784 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 1003 (1964), which was quoted also by the Supreme
Court in Carey v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 375 U.S. 261, 271 (1964).
85. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 1101.501 (Supp. 1976) (emphasis added).
86. Division 85, Transit Union v. Port Authority, 417 Pa. 299, 208 A.2d 271
(1965); National Transit Co. v. Boardman, 328 Pa. 450, 197 A. 239 (1938); Noecker
v. Woods, 259 Pa. 160, 102 A. 507 (1917); Lynn v. Lynn, 256 Pa. 563, 100 A. 975
(1917); Kuzmen v. Kamien, 139 Pa. Super. 538, 12 A.2d 471 (1940).
87. Deibert v. Rhodes, 291 Pa. 550, 140 A. 515 (1928); Commonwealth ex rel.
Bell v. Powell, 249 Pa. 144, 94 A. 746 (1915); Stegmaier v. Jones, 203 Pa. 47, 52
A. 56 (1902).
88. Division 85, Transit Union v. Port Authority, 417 Pa. 299, 302, 208 A.2d
271,272 (1965).
89. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 55, § 563.2 (1964).
90. 417 Pa. 299, 303, 208 A.2d 271, 273 (1965).
91. Id.
92. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 1101.502 (Supp. 1976).
93. The Pennsylvania supreme court in Noecker v. Woods, 259 Pa. 160, 166,
of "shall" in section 501, however, is not this formal statutory use, but
is like the use in section 503, wherein PERA states, "[t]he board
shall establish" panels of persons to be used as fact-finding boards.9 4
It does not appear that the Board has any choice but to establish
such panels.
The drafters of PERA seem carefully to have differentiated
between the imperative and the permissive by using "shall" as impera-
tive and "may" as permissive. Section 602(a)95 provides a good
example of the use of these words. A public employer "may recog-
nize" a union as collective bargaining representative without an elec-
tion.96 If it does, the Board "shall" issue a certification of representa-
tion to the union if it finds that the unit agreed upon by the employer
and the union is appropriate.
9 7
The purpose of PERA is consistent with interpretation of "shall"
in an imperative sense. The public policy statement in the Act states
a legislative intent to prevent unresolved labor disputes from interfer-
ing with the supply of public services by creating "adequate means"
for their resolution, including "establishing procedures to provide for
the protection of the rights of the public employee, the public employ-
er, and the public at large." ' The processes of the PLRB are one of
these procedures. The legislative intent was to make available all
PERA procedures for the resolution of disputes, including the proce-
dures of the Board. This is pertinent also to the Collyer dissenters'
objection that deferral is like subcontracting the resolution of statuto-
ry issues to private arbitrators.9 The dissenters have reminded
the NLRB that there is a public as well as private interest to be served
in adjudication of unfair labor practices.' 00  PERA, of course,
strongly emphasizes the public interest. It refers to the "paramount
right of the citizens of this Commonwealth to keep inviolate the
guarantees for their health, safety, and welfare."'' 1  The objection
102 A. 507, 509 (1917) held such language permissive and stated this rule: "The
words 'shall have the power' merely authorize; the word 'shall' is mandatory."
94. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 1101.503 (Supp. 1976).
95. Id. § 1101.602(a).
96. The employer is given a choice between voluntarily recognizing a union
claiming to represent employees without an election and going through the election
process defined in PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, §H 1101.603-.605 (Supp. 1976).
97. Id. § 1101.602(a).
98. Id. § 1101.101.
99. Collyer Insulated Wire, 192 NLRB 837, 847, 77 LRRM 1931, 1944 (1971)
(Fanning, Member, dissenting); National Radio Co., 198 NLRB 527, 533, 80 LRRM
1718, 1725 (1972) (Fanning and Jenkins, Members, dissenting).
100. Collyer Insulated Wire, 192 NLRB 837, 853, 77 LRRM 1931, 1946-1947
(1971) (Jenkins, Member, dissenting); National Radio Co., 198 NLRB 527, 533-34,
80 LRRM 1718, 1725 (1972) (Fanning and Jenkins, Members, dissenting).
101. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 1101.101 (Supp. 1976). See State College Educ.
Ass'n v. PLRB, 9 Pa. Com. 229, 235, 308 A.2d 404, 409 (1973), modified, 461 Pa.





that an arbitrator adjudicates only the private interests of the employ-
ees and employers would have some merit if, in fact, the result of
deferral were the abridgement of the public interest. The national
Board seeks to prevent the complete abrogation of its statutory duty
to administer NLRA by retaining authority to determine whether
arbitration awards that follow deferral are "repugnant to the act" and
whether the arbitrations from which they resulted were "fair and
regular."10'  A similar review policy adopted as part of a PLRB
deferral policy might be sufficient to meet objections that the state
Board is not adequately guarding the interests entrusted to its protec-
tion.
D. Summary
This discussion leads to the conclusion that PERA does not
permit the state Board to refuse to process unfair labor practice
charges brought before it. Although arbitration has great import-
ance to the scheme of PERA, nothing in the Act supports a finding
that the legislature preferred arbitration to resolution of a dispute in
an unfair labor practice proceeding, which is the basis of the NLRB's
adoption of the Collyer doctrine. Moreover, an examination of the
provisions of PERA reveals that the PLRB is vested with exclusive
authority to remedy unfair labor practices and that when there is a
conflict between PLRB adjudications and arbitration awards, PLRB
adjudications prevail. But most importantly, PERA contains a provi-
sion specifically directing the state Board to exercise the powers and
to perform the duties entrusted to it.
Thus, the inescapable conclusion is that PERA creates two
systems by which labor disputes involving related contractual and
statutory issues may be resolved. PERA gives an aggrieved party
a choice of forums or permits him to pursue relief in both forums,
and appears to bar the PLRB from depriving a party of that
choice.' 03
102. Collyer Insulated Wire, 192 NLRB 837, 77 LRRM 1931 (1971). The
NLRB dissenters from the Collyer policy view these standards as inadequate to
protect the public interest. Id. at 853, 77 LRRM at 1949-1950 (Jenkins, Member,
dissenting).
103. The state supreme court has obliquely referred to an election between
statutory remedies in situations in which PERA and non-PERA remedies are availa-
ble to an employee. Board of Educ. v. Philadelphia Teachers, Local No. 3,
- Pa. -, - n.16, 346 A.2d 35, 42 n.16 (1975). Whether or not an elec-
tion between PERA remedies is required has not yet been determined. See Note,
III. Policy Considerations
Because the Pennsylvania supreme court has already indicated
that in its opinion PERA embodies a state policy favoring arbitra-
tion, 104 and because of the respect properly given to the NLRB by the
state courts and the PLRB, it is necessary to assess the policy
considerations favoring and opposing the NLRB deferral policy to
determine which considerations are applicable to PERA and, on
balance, which ones deserve the greatest weight. Although policy
considerations favoring deferral cannot overcome lack of authority
to defer, they can elucidate a need for legislation to permit deferral
if they are sufficiently compelling. If policy considerations weigh
against deferral, they support the present statutory language. This
examination will lead to a conclusion whether, on the basis of policy
considerations, the PLRB should adopt or should be empowered to
adopt a deferral policy.
A. Policy Considerations Cited as Favoring Adoption of a Deferral
Policy
1. Avoids Fragmentation of the Issues.-As authority for its
concern with fragmentation of issues between forums, the NLRB has
quoted °5 a statement made by the Supreme Court in Carey v.
Westinghouse Electric Corp: 6
By allowing the dispute to go to arbitration its fragmenta-
tion is avoided to a substantial extent; and those conciliatory
measures which Congress deemed vital to "industrial peace"
• . . and which may be dispositive of the entire dispute, are en-
couraged. The superior authority of the Board may be invoked
at any time. Meanwhile the therapy of arbitration is brought
to bear in a complicated and troubled area.
Obviously, a system that permits resolution of disputes by two differ-
ent tribunals will sometimes result in fragmentation of issues: a labor
board may have to determine contractual issues in its adjudication of
an unfair labor practice charge, and if a grievance on the subject is
placed before an arbitrator, the possibility exists that the two adjudi-
cators will reach different decisions. If the PLRB's determinations
supersede those of arbitrators under PERA, as the national Board's
do under NLRA,"°7 there will never be a question as to which con-
Public Sector Grievance Procedures, Due Process, and the Duty of Fair Representa-
tion, 89 HARV. L. REv. 752, 760-61 (1976).
104. Board of Educ. v. Philadelphia Fed. of Teachers, Local No. 3, - Pa. -,
-, 346 A.2d 35, 39 (1975). See notes 56-57 and accompanying text supra.
105. National Radio Co., 198 NLRB 527, 531, 80 LRRM 1718, 1722 (1972).
106. 375 U.S. 261, 272 (1964).
107. Carey v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 375 U.S. 261 (1964); Local 7-210, Oil






It appears that the PLRB has already adopted a limited deferral
policy that corresponds to two pre-Collyer NLRB cases. In Spiel-
berg Manufacturing Co.'"9 the NLRB instituted a policy of refusing
to assume full jurisdiction over an unfair labor charge if an arbitra-
tion award covering the substance of the charge had issued before
the case was brought to the NLRB, provided that the arbitration pro-
ceeding was fair and regular, the parties had agreed to be bound,
and the award was not repugnant to the NLRB. The following
quote, albeit dictum, from the PLRB's decision in Rose Tree Media
School District"0 demonstrates the PLRB's philosophical adherence
to the Spielberg principle:
The Board is reluctant to inject itself into employer-em-
ployee relations especially where, as here, there are clearly
defined contractual methods for resolving employer-employee
disputes. The Board will however entertain charges of unfair
practice despite contractual provisions for their resolution where
there is a serious threat to employee rights under the Act ...
However, in the instant case, contractual remedies were avail-
able and were in fact utilized to adjust the Association's griev-
ance. . . Therefore, the Board in this case is compelled to
defer to the contractual provisions."'
Spielberg was taken a step further in Dubo Manufacturing
Corp." 2 There, the NLRB postponed its consideration of an unfair
labor practice charge pending the decision of an arbitrator with whom
a grievance on the same subject had been filed simultaneously. A
similar attitude is evidenced by the PLRB's statement in General
Braddock Area School District:"'
The board firmly believes that where the dispute centers
around an interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement
consummated by the parties, there the policy of Act 195
[PERA] is best served by allowing the grievance and arbitration
procedure necessarily a part of all contracts to be completed. 114
Since it appears that the PLRB already is following Spielberg"1 5
108. The basis of the cases holding NLRB determinations supreme is 29 U.S.C.
§ 160(a) (1970). That section has an analogue in PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 1301
(Supp. 1976), and the same rule is therefore likely to be followed under PERA.
109. 112 NLRB 1080, 36 LRRM 1152 (1955).
110. 4 PPER 153 (1974).
111. Id. at 154.
112. 142 NLRB 431, 53 LRRM 1070 (1963).
113. 6 PPER 99, appeal dismissed, 6 PPER 353 (C.P. Allegheny County 1975).
114. Id. at 100.
115. See notes 109-11 and accompanying text supra.
and Dubo-type"116 deferral policies, a situation in which issues are
fragmented will occur only if a party who has instituted board pro-
ceedings thereafter decides also to use the contractual grievance-
arbitration procedure."17 Because short time limitations on the filing
of grievances are usually written into collective bargaining agree-
ments, 1 18 it will be a rare dispute that is grieved after board proceed-
ings have proceeded very far. Therefore, fragmentation of issues
could be avoided in most such cases if the Dubo-type policy simply
were extended to permit the Board to hold in abeyance the unfair
labor practice proceedings while arbitration is pursued."19 The num-
ber of cases in which fragmentation of issues would be avoided by
adoption of a Collyer-like policy would be negligible.
2. Protects the Union-Employer Relationship from the Disrup-
tion Caused by Board Intervention.-The NLRB majority regards
any unsettling effect of board intervention in labor disputes as unde-
sirable, 2 ° but the dissenters consider it to be a necessary incident to
enforcement of statutory rights:
The significance of the "unsettling effect" of a Board decision
is simply that the protection of statutory rights often requires
more than an arbitrator is empowered to decide, or will award.
Thus the "unsettlement" will vary directly with the extent to
which arbitration will or may fall short of what the statute com-
mands.121
Similarity between the remedies available to the state and national
labor boards-e.g., a cease and desist order, appropriate back pay-
indicates that the effect of a PLRB adjudication is comparable 22 to
116. See notes 112-14 and accompanying text supra.
117. Under Spielberg and Dubo, if an arbitration award has issued, or if
arbitration has been invoked, the board will either defer to the award, if certain
standards are met, or will hold its proceedings in abeyance pending arbitration and
thereafter defer to the award. In General Braddock the PLRB seemed to expand
Dubo to permit deferral as long as a grievance had been filed, instead of requiring
that arbitration have been invoked. 6 PPER 99, appeal dismissed, 6 PPER 353 (C.P.
Allegheny County 1975).
118. Cf. Collyer Insulated Wire, 192 NLRB 837, 846-47, 77 LRRM 1931, 1941
(Fanning, Member, dissenting).
119. That is, if the charging party filed a grievance after it had instituted PLRB
proceedings, the board would be permitted to halt its processing of the case pending
arbitration of the grievance.
120. National Radio Co., 198 NLRB 527, 532, 80 LRRM 1718, 1723 (1972).
The board relied on the words of the Fifth Circuit in Sinclair Ref. Co. v. NLRB,
306 F.2d 569, 579 (5th Cir. 1962), in which the court spoke deprecatingly of the
role of the NLRB in contractual disputes. The General Counsel acts, the court said,
"as a sort of protector of the general public interest . . . not in the manner best cal-
culated to bring an end to the dispute but in a manner thought, from that lofty van-
tage, to be best for the general good." Id. The Fifth Circuit's holding, which re-
quired the NLRB to refrain from handling unfair labor practice charges that concern
arbitrable contractual issues was specifically disapproved in NLRB v. Acme Indus.
Co., 385 U.S. 432, 437 n.5 (1967).
121. National Radio Co., 198 NLRB 527, 535, 80 LRRM 1718, 1727 (1972)
(Fanning and Jenkins, Members, dissenting).
122. Compare 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1970) with PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, §
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that of the NLRB. Whether, in fact, board proceedings directly
cause more disruption than arbitration proceedings, the conclusion of
the NLRB, is questionable, and the NLRB provided no empirical
evidence to support this finding.'2 3 Even if it is true, its import-
ance in PERA cases is more than likely outweighed by something that
does not ordinarily occur in private sector disputes-publicity. Any
adjudication by a board or an arbitrator that significantly affects
public employers, whose activities and well-being are the subjects of
public interest, is bound to receive widespread press coverage.
124
Public sentiment on one side or the other may be more disruptive to
labor relations than the adjudication itself. This considerably dim-
inshes the significance of which procedure is used to decide the
dispute.
3. Permits Caseload Reduction and More Effective Utilization of
Resources.-If all disputes were taken to labor boards that could be,
the boards would be inundated with work. 125  Although there ap-
pears to be some sort of natural balance sensed by aggrieved persons
that leads them away from the labor boards, 126 the spectre of becom-
ing the favored forum for resolution of disputes has long haunted the
NLRB.127
At present there does not seem to be a caseload problem at the
PLRB. Although the state Board has noted that the number of
unfair labor practice cases has been increasing each year, it has not
said that the caseload is becoming too great for it to handle. 128  Thus,
1101.1303 (Supp. 1976). Both boards have power to "issue and cause to be served
on such person [the respondent] an order requiring such person to cease and desist
from such unfair labor practice," and to require the respondent to take "affirmative
action," including reinstatement of employees "with or without back pay."
123. The Fifth Circuit's remarks cited by the NLRB majority in National Radio
Co., see note 121, supra, are similarly wholly subjective.
124. The "fishbowl" environment of public sector labor relations is thought to
have a detrimental effect on collective bargaining. W. MAGGIOLO, TECHNIQUES OF
MEDIATION OF LABOR DisPuTEs 113-14 (1971).
125. As noted by the Board in United Aircraft Corp., 204 NLRB 880, 83 LRRM
1411, 1413 (1973),
[W]e are not particularly desirous of inviting any labor organization . . .
to bypass their own procedures and to seek adjudication by this Board of
the innumerable individual disputes which are likely to arise. . . . Fortu-
nately, most labor organizations under such circumstances do not come to
us with such problems and instead voluntarily resolve them with the em-
ployers under their contracts.
126. Id.
127. Id. See Consolidated Aircraft Corp., 47 NLRB 694, 12 LRRM 44 (1943),
enf'd in pertinent part, 141 F.2d 785 (9th Cir. 1944).
128. In 1971, the first full year in which PERA was in force, 157 unfair labor
practice cases were begun. 1970-73 PLRB REP. 200 (1974). The number increased
even if the caseload consideration were a permissible justification for
adoption of a deferral policy, it does not yet appear to exist at the
PLRB.
4. Permits Resolution of Contractual Issues by Arbitrators.-
The special expertise of labor arbitrators is an advantage of the
arbitration system.' 29 Although the expertise of labor arbitrators in
labor contract disputes will probably often exceed that of judges, 130
the same is not necessarily true of PLRB members. The Board is an
administrative agency with a special expertise in labor relations. 3'
Whenever a dispute involves issues which do not relate directly to
contract language, the PLRB is no less competent than an arbitrator.
And whenever a statutory issue is involved, the Board's expertise is
superior to that of an arbitrator.1
3 2
5. Power in Impartial Third Party Has Beneficial Effect.-In
Board of Education v. Philadelphia Federation of Teachers, Local
No. 3, the state supreme court quoted a law review article list-
ing beneficial effects of public sector labor arbitration.- 3  Among
those listed were the following: (1) the labor contract is more
meaningful because workers have more confidence in it know-
ing that disputes over it will be submitted to an impartial third party
for resolution; (2) employer decision-making is more careful when
employers know their decision may be subjected to the scrutiny of an
arbitrator, who may reverse them; and (3) the reluctance of employ-
ers to have their decisions reviewed by outside parties creates pressure
to settle grievances at lower levels. Each of these considerations
depends upon the availability not specifically of an aribtrator, but of
an impartial third party. The impartial third party role could be
filled as effectively by the PLRB as by an arbitrator.
6. Arbitration Expense Encourages Voluntary Resolution.-An-
other supposedly salutary characteristic of arbitration is the effect of
its cost in encouraging voluntary dispute resolution. 34  The PLRB
to 202 cases in 1972, 248 cases in 1973, id. at 201-202, and 283 cases in 1974. 1974
PLRB REP. 126 (1975).
129. Steelworkers Union v. Warrior & Gulf Nay. Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960);
Cox, Reflections Upon Labor Arbitration, 72 Huv. L. REv. 1482, 1498-99 (1959).
130. The labor arbitrator performs functions which are not normal to
the courts; the considerations which help him fashion judgments may indeed
be foreign to the competence of courts. . . . The ablest judge cannot be
expected to bring the same experience and competence to bear upon the de-
termination of a grievance, because he cannot be similarly informed.
Steelworkers Union v. Warrior & Gulf Nav. Co., 363 U.S. 574, 581-82 (1960).
131. Western Psychiatric Inst. v. PLRB, 16 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 204, 330
A.2d 247 (1974).
132. Cf. National Radio Co., 198 NLRB 527, 533, 80 LRRM 1718, 1725 (Fan-
ning and Jenkins, Members, dissenting).
133. - Pa. -, - n.9, 346 A.2d 35, 39 n.9 (1975). The court quoted from
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can supply this incentive almost as well as arbitration. Although
there is no charge for initial access to the PLRB, the state board,
unlike the NLRB, does not prosecute complaints itself.' There-
fore, the cost of prosecution and defense must be borne by the
parties to a board proceeding. Of course, there is no charge for the
services of the board's hearing examiner, as there is for an arbitrator.
B. Policy Considerations Cited as Opposing Adoption of a Deferral
Policy
There are at least six considerations militating against adop-
tion of a deferral policy that deserve to be balanced against those
discussed above.
1. Remedies Available in Arbitration are Inadequate to Remedy
Unfair Labor Practices.-The Collyer policy dissenters have argued
that arbitration is an inadequate substitute for board proceedings
because arbitrators cannot render the type of relief needed to remedy
some unfair labor practices. 1 6 In one case, in which an employer
unilaterally instituted changes in working conditions that it had been
unable to win in collective bargaining, the dissenters concluded that
the remedy that could be given by the arbitrator-the reversal of
the employer's action-was inadequate to correct the offense.'" 7 The
dissenters argued that what was needed was an order compelling the
employer to bargain over the changes, enjoining the unilateral
change in conditions, and prohibiting such changes in the future. 8'
The validity of these objections is questionable. It may be that
an arbitrator cannot compel collective bargaining, but the arbitrator
can return working conditions to the status quo ante. 3 9  If an
135. NLRA grants the NLRB General Counsel "final authority . . . in respect
of the prosecution of such [unfair labor practice] complaints before the Board. 29
U.S.C. § 153 (d) (1970). Under PERA, prosecution is left to "the representatives of
the employee organization or party filing the charge" and, if it wishes to intervene,
the state department of justice. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 1101.1306 (Supp. 1976).
After a finding of a violation is made, the PLRB assumes the role of prosecutor if
enforcement proceedings are necessary. See generally id. §§ 1101.1201-.1607.
136. Collyer Insulated Wire, 192 NLRB 837, 855, 77 LRRM 1931, 1949 (1971)
(Jenkins, Member, dissenting).
137. Columbus & S. Ohio Elec. Co., 205 NLRB 187, 83 LRRM 1558, 1560
(1973).
138. Id.
139. If an arbitrator finds, for example, that an employer has violated the
contract by unilaterally changing working conditions, the arbitrator may rescind the
employer's action. E.g., Atomic Uniform Corp. v. Garment Workers, Local 91,
86 LRRM 2331 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (arbitrator properly ordered employer to re-open
factory).
employer wanted to re-institute the change, after issuance of such an
order, it is likely that he would submit to bargaining voluntarily. The
objection that an arbitrator's award cannot give prospective relief may
also be meritless. Arbitrators have begun to use equitable remedies
that would be an adequate substitute for a labor board order. 140  It is
not certain that this practice will find widespread acceptance, espe-
cially in application to governments and their agencies as employers,
but if it does, it will undermine the dissenters' objections.
2. Deferral Results in Delay of Dispute Resolution.-NLRB
deferral has, on occasion, resulted in obvious delay in resolution of
disputes.' It is problematic, however, whether adoption of a defer-
ral policy by the PLRB would accelerate or slow down adjudications.
The PLRB proceeds more expeditiously than the national Board
because it conducts no investigation before issuing a complaint. 42  A
complaint is dispatched almost automatically upon receipt of a
charge, the employer is permitted to answer, and the hearing is
held. 43  The question whether deferral generally will result in
delay of adjudication depends on the structure and condition of the
pertinent grievance-arbitration procedure. 44
3. Board Action Affords Better Protection to the Aggrieved.-
In cases in which statutory and contractual issues are not congruent
and in rare cases in which they are, frequently board adjudication
ultimately will offer more protection to an aggrieved party than
arbitration. 145  The classic example is a charge of employer discrimi-
140. Sonic Knitting Indus. & Garment Workers, Local 600-601, 65 LA 453
(1975) (arbitrator issues cease and desist order against employer's violation of union
recognition clause); Amoco Chem. Corp. & Oil Workers, Local 4-449, 63 LA 1196
(1974) (union ordered to file grievance on behalf of employee). But see Reimer
Meat Prod. Inc. and Teamsters, Local 75, 59 LA 312 (1972) (arbitrator lacks
authority to fashion equitable remedy).
141. Tyee Constr. Co., 211 NLRB 600, 601, 86 LRRM 1553, 1554 (1974)
(Fanning and Jenkins, Members, dissenting), supplementing 202 NLRB 307, 82
LRRM 1448 (1973); Typographers, Local 12 (A.S. Abell Co.), 201 NLRB 120, 121,
82 LRRM 1227, 1228 (1973) (Jenkins, Member, dissenting).
142. The PLRB is granted power by section 1601 of PERA to investigate unfair
labor practices. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 1101.1601 (Supp. 1976). It does not,
however, exercise that power, but instead issues complaints as a matter of course upon
the filing of a charge. PA. CODE § 95.13(c).
143. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 1101.1302 (Supp. 1976); PA. CODE
95.13 (c).
144. If the board were to defer to an arbitration procedure in which all
participants acted with alacrity, the dispute ought to be resolved quickly. Where,
however, the arbitration procedure works slowly, and where there is a backlog of
matters to be arbitrated, adjudication by the board may be the more expeditious
means of resolution.
145. Typographers Local 12 (A.S. Abell Co.), 201 NLRB 120, 82 LRRM
1127, 1128 (1973) (Jenkins, Member, dissenting); Jos. T. Ryerson & Sons, Inc., 199
NLRB 461, 81 LRRM 1261, 1266 (1973) (Fanning and Jenkins, Members, dis-
senting); Appalachian Power Co., 198 NLRB 576, 580, 80 LRRM 1731, 1735-36
(1972) (Fanning and Jenkins, Members, dissenting); National Radio Co., 198 NLRB
527, 533, 80 LRRM 1718, 1725 (1972) (Fanning and Jenkins, Members, dissenting).
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nation against an employee on account of union activities. The
standard labor contract language permits an employer to discharge an
employee for "just cause." Under PERA, however, a contractually
permissible discharge is unlawful if undertaken for a discriminatory
motive. Thus, an employee might be properly discharged under the
contract, but illegally discharged under PERA.14 6 Of course, the
employee will receive the greatest protection if he is permitted to
pursue his remedies in both forums.
14 7
4. The High Cost of Arbitration Means That Unfair Labor
Practices Will Go Unresolved.-A dissenter to Collyer noted that
average arbitration costs in 1970 were more than $500.00 per day
excluding attorneys' fees, stenographers' fees, witnesses' expenses,
and room rental.1 48  The true cost is much higher. At such cost
an aggrieved party will carefully consider a decision to take a griev-
ance to arbitration. If a labor board refuses to hear a charge, a
grievance might never be pursued. Whenever an aggrieved party
does not realize his full statutory rights, PERA clearly is frustrated,'49
and the unresolved dispute may fester. Because many public em-
ployers possess taxing power and because the vast majority of unfair
labor practice charges are filed by unions and employees, 5 ' it is
obvious that unions and employees will suffer most from the expense
of arbitration forced upon an aggrieved party by a deferral policy.
The expense consideration could, perhaps, be overcome by per-
mitting excessive expense or inability to afford arbitration to be used
146. In many, and perhaps most, discharge cases, a good reason may exist
for firing the employee; if so, the arbitration inquiry ends there, and the
employee is out of a job. The [NLRA], however, requires that the em-
ployee be protected against discharge for union reasons, even though there
may be a different and good reason for his discharge.
National Radio Co., 198 NLRB 527, 534, 80 LRRM 1718, 1725 (1972) (Fanning
and Jenkins, Members, dissenting).
147. In that way the employer's just cause ground will be determined by an
arbitrator, and the question of discriminatory motive will be examined by the labor
board. Id.
148. 192 NLRB 837, 854, 77 LRRM 1931, 1948 (1971) (Jenkins, Member,
dissenting).
149. The statement of public policy with which the legislature prefaced PERA
states that "[u]nresolved disputes between the public employer and its employees are
injurious to the public," and an aim of PERA is to minimize them and provide for
their resolution. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 1101.101 (Supp. 1976).
150. From 1970 through 1974 the number of unfair labor practices filed against
employers and unions was as follows:
1970 1971 1972 1973 1974
Against employers 13 118 167 206 232
Against unions 2 40 36 42 50
Sources: 1970-73 PLRB RaP. 199-202 (1974); 1974 PLRB REP. 126 (1975).
as a defense to a respondent's deferral request. To prevent this
defense from being used unjustly, however, it would be necessary for
the board to examine the finances of the aggrieved party and to
adjudicate the party's financial ability to arbitrate. Such a task would
be very time-consuming and onerous for the board.
5. The Availability of Board Proceedings as an Instrument of
Coercion Leads to Voluntary Settlement.-The 1974 PLRB annual
report stated,
Again last year the most obvious trend among the charge
cases was the number withdrawn by complainants prior to dispo-
sition by the Board. For 1974 the withdrawal rate was 33.2
percent, down from the 48 percent rate of the prior year. These
high rates would indicate that formal charges are viewed as a
strategic tool as well as machinery for enforcing provisions of
Act 195 [PERA]. Indications are that the strategy often
proves successful by actually triggering resolution of disputes
which lead to formal charges. When a complainant requests
permission to withdraw an unfair practice charge, it is not un-
common for him to indicate that an agreement has been
reached, and making Board action unnecessary. 151
Availability of PLRB procedures leads to voluntary, "out-of-court"
settlement of disputes. The removal of these procedures as a "stra-
tegic tool" for use by parties would have a deleterious, rather than
a beneficial, effect on labor relations.
6. Deferral Forces an Aggrieved Party to Arbitrate Against His
Will and Sometimes in Contravention of His Contractual Obli-
gations.- Whenever an unfair labor practice charge is deferred to
arbitration, the decision of the party who brought the charge is
reversed. Originally, the charging party had a choice between going
to arbitration and going to the board, and chose the board. By
permitting a respondent to raise arbitrability of the subject matter of a
charge as a defense, and to obtain deferral, the labor board removes
the choice of forums from the province of the aggrieved, and places
it in the province of the alleged wrongdoer. 15 The precept that the
injured party is entitled to chose the forum in which his action is to be
tried is a long-standing principle of American jurisprudence 53 and is
inapplicable only in special circumstances.' The Collyer deferral
policy deprives a charging party of that choice.
151. 1974 PLRB REP. 75 (1975).
152. Cf. Collyer Insulated Wire, 192 NLRB 837, 846-47, 77 LRRM 1931, 1941
(Fanning, Member, dissenting).
153. The choice of forums, when concurrent jurisdiction in the federal and state
courts exists, and the choice of venue are traditionally the plaintiff's. Cf. M/S
Brennen v. Zapata Offshore Co., 407 U.S. 1 (1972); Shamrock Oil & Gas Corp. v.
Sheets, 313 U.S. 100 (1941).
154. The right to remove an action from a state forum to a federal court is
permitted only when specifically authorized by Congress, and removal statutes are
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A deferral policy may also result in forcing arbitration of a
dispute under circumstances in which the applicable collective bar-
gaining agreement does not require arbitration. Although PERA
requires every grievance procedure to culminate in arbitration, it
permits parties to bargain over the procedure itself,155 which includes
such matters as time limits on filing of grievances and requesting of
arbitration.156 Since these time limits are customarily short, it is
likely that by the time a labor board orders arbitration, the time limits
will have expired. As a result, arbitration will be ordered even
though under the contract it could no longer be invoked.1
57
C. Summary
Although several policy considerations tend to support the
PLRB's adoption of a deferral policy, most considerations, includ-
ing the more important considerations, militate against it. PERA
deems the protection of statutory rights and the resolution of disputes
basic to accomplishment of its primary objective-preventing dis-
ruption of the supply of public services. A Collyer-like deferral
policy may result in statutory issues going unanswered and in statu-
tory rights thereby going unprotected. Disputes will be unresolved,
and damage will be done to the labor relations of the parties involved.
Hence, even if this author's conclusion that the statute prohibits
deferral is rejected, such a policy should not be adopted because
of policy considerations.
IV. Conclusion
This examination of PERA compels two conclusions. First, the
structure of PERA does not permit the PLRB to defer jurisdiction
over unfair labor charges to arbitration. Second, even if de-
ferral were permissible under PERA, policy considerations do not
warrant the adoption of such a policy. The Pennsylvania supreme
court's statement that PERA favors arbitration 58 should not be
strictly construed against the right of removal. Shamrock Oil & Gas Corp. v. Sheets,
313 U.S. 100 (1941).
155. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 1101.903 (Supp. 1976).
156. Cf. John Wiley & Sons v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543 (1964); Collyer Insu-
lated Wire, 192 NLRB 837, 847, 77 LRRM 1931, 1941 (Fanning, Member, dissent-
ing).
157. Indeed, this is exactly what happened in Collyer and National Radio.
158. Board of Educ. v. Philadelphia Fed. of Teachers, Local No. 3, - Pa. -,
-, 346 A.2d 35, 39 (1975).
interpreted to justify adoption of a deferral policy, but only as a
recognition of the significance of arbitration to the PERA scheme.
And the PLRB should resist arguments aimed at persuading it to
adopt a deferral policy to avoid abrogating its explicit statutory duty
"to prevent any person from engaging in any unfair labor prac-
tice. ''
9
159. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 1101.1301 (Supp. 1976).
